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Issues of time and temporality pervade American constitutional adjudication, at both a doctrinal and a broader, structural level. The doctrinal issue
concerns the extent to which judicial decisions operate forward, backward, or
some combination of both across time. The structural issue concerns the related
and overarching question of how the Supreme Court, as a court, operates in
time, and the temporal division of authority between courts and legislatures. In
both contexts, the Supreme Court is an actor in time.
This Article examines the Court’s treatment of temporal issues through
three case studies: (1) a pair of early decisions in which the Court confronted
both the transition from the colonial to the republican constitutional regime,
and the temporal scope of legislative acts; (2) the Court’s twentieth-century doctrine on adjudicative retroactivity; and (3) the recent case of Grutter v. Bollinger, in which the Court’s temporal imperialism led it to claim ever-greater
power to define the relevant timeframe for antidiscrimination law. The Court’s
institutional self-presentation suggests that it is immortal and therefore not
temporally bound, and that claim of continuity typically extends to its decisions. But the causal flow from institutional to doctrinal continuity sometimes
breaks down. Perhaps not surprisingly, these moments of disjunction tend to
arise when the Court chooses to allow them to. Even in situations that call into
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question the continuity of a particular doctrine, therefore, the Court remains
master of time in that it as an institution determines when and how the façade
of doctrinal continuity is to be breached.
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We shed as we pick up, like travellers who must carry everything in their
arms, and what we let fall will be picked up by those behind. The procession is very long and life is very short. We die on the march. But
1
there is nothing outside the march so nothing can be lost to it.

INTRODUCTION
Unlike many modern constitutional democracies, the United
States is still in its first republic. This means that the entity called “the
United States of America,” as created by the Constitution, can be said
to exist in a continuous relationship from 1789 to the present day.
Yet even to speak of the “first republic” seems odd: why use an
ordinal number to denote the first and, so far, the only? But thinking
of the American constitutional regime in this sense—as just one in a
potential series of regimes—is useful because it calls into question one
of the central assumptions of American constitutional law: the idea
that the Republic of 2010 is in a fundamental sense continuous with
that of 1789. This assumption is particularly evident in the Supreme
Court’s case law, in which the Court regularly refers to the decisions
of past decades or even centuries as “our” decisions, or in the custom
of tracing particular seats on the Court back to their first occupants in
the late-eighteenth or early-nineteenth century. The Court’s self2
presentation and self-conception thus presume continuity.

1

TOM STOPPARD, ARCADIA act 1, sc. 3, at 38 (1993).
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“In Jones & Laughlin
Steel [1937], we held that the question of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause ‘is necessarily one of degree.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. at 574
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The history of our Commerce Clause decisions contains at least
two lessons of relevance to this case.” (emphasis added)).
2
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The Justices’ rhetorical insistence that the Court is both a continuous and a unitary institution is striking, however, given the obvious
changes in membership and doctrine that the Court as an institution
has witnessed since its founding, as well as the relative rarity of per curiam decisions since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall. As an
analytic matter, one might reasonably argue that no such entity as “the
Court” exists; rather, the Supreme Court is a series of courts connected across a series of cases that exist along a series of moments in
time. For the most part, however, the Justices’ decisions suppress this
multiplicity and discontinuity in favor of a posture of unitariness and
continuity. The composition of the Court thus changes over time, but
the language of the decisions that issue from the Court presumes fixedness and permanence, presenting the Court as a single continuous
entity with a single lifespan.
Questions of time and temporality pervade American constitu3
tional theory, at both a doctrinal and a broader, structural level. The
doctrinal issue concerns the extent to which law—in the forms of both
judicial precedent and legislative action—operates forward, backward,
or some combination of both across time. Implicating fundamental
questions of justice, fairness, and notice, these inquiries typically involve situations in which the Supreme Court sets temporal boundaries
on its own decisions or on the actions of another branch of government—usually a legislature—with important consequences for individual litigants. The structural issue concerns the related and overarching question of how the Court, as a court, operates in time, and
how the Justices articulate the temporal division of authority between
courts and legislatures.
3

See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 16-32 (1991)
(discussing “constitutional moments” that transformed the constitutional basis of the
Republic); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT (2001) (discussing the problem of constitutionalism over time); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME
(2004) (critiquing the consequences of modern notions of time for liberal democracy); Lior Barshack, Time and the Constitution, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 553, 553 (2009) (describing two types of sovereignty: “immanent” sovereignty that “belongs to the living”
and “transcendent” sovereignty that “belongs . . . to the dead and to those yet to be
born”); Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2010) (manuscript at 1-4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374454
(discussing the meaning and significance of “wartime”); Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in
Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1641-44 (1989)
(analyzing how indeterminacies in Western notions of time are worked out in the law);
Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 606, 610-11 (2008) (examining the connections between theories of constitutional authority “across generations” and methods of constitutional interpretation).
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In both contexts, the Court is one among many actors, existing—
as all actors must—in time. Yet the Court typically disavows this identity, presenting itself as an institution operating in a much larger temporal sphere than that of any particular human observer, in a realm
continuous with the Constitution itself. For the most part, such a view
comports with a general sense that the Court must operate in this way,
that in fact it is precisely the function of courts as courts to stand for
continuity. One need only think of the judicial norms of stare decisis
and precedential reasoning to appreciate the special relationship that
courts have with time.
Occasionally, however, the Court explicitly confronts the question
of time—specifically, the question of change over time. These moments of confrontation occur when the Court self-consciously addresses the issue of the temporal effect, or lifespan, of a particular legislative act or judicial decision. And here is the puzzle this Article
takes up. The Court’s institutional self-presentation suggests that it is
immortal and therefore not temporally bound, and that claim of continuity typically extends to the product of that institution—namely, its
decisions. But not always. The causal flow from institutional to doctrinal continuity sometimes breaks down. Perhaps not surprisingly,
these moments of disjunction tend to arise when the Court chooses to
allow them to. Even in situations that call into question the continuity
of a particular doctrine, therefore, the Court remains master of time
in that it as an institution determines when and how the façade of
doctrinal continuity is to be breached. In these moments, two stories
about the Court and time emerge: first, the lifespan of any judicial or
legislative act is potentially finite but unknown until the moment of its
demise; second, the demise will be brought about by an entity that
very likely predated, and certainly will endure after, the act in question.
To be sure, the issue of legal change is fundamental to all legal
systems, especially systems founded on a written constitution. But the
Court’s unique role as a court bound by no other court, and bound
very little (or perhaps not at all) by the decisions of any legislature,
means that the Justices have a far greater power to define lifespans
than do other courts. Further, it means that the scope of the Justices’
power to terminate a law extends far beyond that of even the most positivist of legislatures. The fact that the Court is not bound to obey
any institution, even itself, means that the question whether the particular judicial decision or legislative act under consideration has outrun its course is in some sense always potentially, and in some cases
actually, before the Court.
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Thus, there are important questions to ask: How does a court that
regards itself and the regime in which it operates as timeless conceive
itself to be functioning in these moments of change? What are the
different approaches the Court uses to conceptualize the temporal
scope of legal change—not with respect to substance, but with respect
to time itself? To what extent does the Court view itself as controlling
this temporal scope? One approach might be to view the transition
from a prior legal state or rule in relative terms: as a two-part legal re4
gime involving the law “before” and the law “after.” A different approach views the transition as unfolding over a more linear, chronological sweep of time, in what might be viewed as a more objective
5
vision of how time operates.
Over the course of the 221 years since our Republic began, the
Court has demonstrated varied and sometimes confused views of how
to understand and manage temporal transitions in the legal regime.
In some cases, the Court has segmented doctrinal time into “before”
and “after,” devoting substantial energy to descrying the proper line
between these periods. In other instances, the Court has presented its
decisions as operating within a more chronological timeframe, packaging its decisions into temporal epochs and attempting to give an ac6
count of how those epochs fit together.
Throughout the Court’s history, explicit considerations of law’s
temporal effect have often accompanied the Justices’ efforts to calculate the moment of a particular law’s origin. These moments of
change involve much more than the straightforward overruling of
prior precedent. Rather, they are moments of transition not only with
respect to substance but with respect to time itself. The question this
Article takes up is not just the Court’s own question in such situations
of how to treat changes in the law, but the broader interpretive question of whether the Court adjusts—or ought to adjust—its own con4

This is a perspectival approach that takes a subjective view of time akin to that
described by the philosopher Hannah Arendt as “human time.” See HANNAH ARENDT,
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 11 (Viking Press 1968) (1961) (associating human time
with “the viewpoint of man, who always lives in the interval between past and future”).
5
Such a view has been described by Arendt as “historical time.” Id. at 9-13 (describing historical time as a “continuum,” as “biographical,” and as “rectilinear temporal movement”). The historian Reinhart Koselleck also employs the phrase “historical time,” albeit in a slightly different sense, referring not only to the linear march of
chronology in general but also to the belief that the chronology itself comprises a series of historically recognized “units of action” such as eras or epochs. See REINHART
KOSELLECK, THE PRACTICE OF CONCEPTUAL HISTORY ch. 6 (Todd Samuel Presner et al.
trans., 2002).
6
I am grateful to Adam Samaha for suggesting the term “packaging.”
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ception of how its decisions operate in time. Moments of doctrinal
discontinuity, in other words, provide useful opportunities to interrogate claims of institutional continuity.
Temporal questions are therefore deeply connected in the Court’s
case law with questions of laws’ origins. When the Court attempts to
identify the moment of a particular legislative or judicial act’s origin,
it is in effect searching for a proper measuring moment or benchmark
upon which to base its assessment of the law’s lifespan. This Article
examines the Court’s efforts to calculate such moments of origin
through three case studies: (1) a pair of cases from the early Republic
in which the Court grappled with the question of the temporal effect
of legislative acts; (2) the late twentieth-century debates about retroactivity in criminal law, in which the Court attempted to reorganize how
its own decisions operate in time; and (3) the recent case of Grutter v.
Bollinger, in which the Court experimented with drawing temporal
7
boundaries around an entire body of doctrine.
The Court frequently speaks as though it is not a temporally
bounded institution. In some areas of case law, however, it explicitly
manipulates the temporal effects of its doctrine. Obviously, the Court
is a historical actor and therefore must always be operating “in time.”
This Article is part of a larger project that aims to understand the
Court’s conflicted and problematic treatment of itself in time. The goal
of this Article, then, is to engage in an intellectual history of how the
Court thinks about time—both in the sense of the temporal effect of its
8
own decisions and in the context of legal transitions more broadly.
I. TEMPORALITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
The Court confronted foundational questions of law’s temporality, and of its own institutional role in defining that temporality, within
the first few years of its existence. Many of these decisions required
the Court to construe provisions of the Constitution that implicated

7

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
By referring to “the Court” as a single entity in this way, I do not mean to suggest
that the Justices are always of one mind, or that the Court as an institution holds a single coherent view of how its decisions operate in time. Still, given the self-identity of
the Justices as members of one Supreme Court of the United States, and the tendency
of those Justices to use phrases such as “We the Court” in their opinions, this Article
will treat the Court as more of an “it” than a “they.” Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is
a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239
(1992) (arguing that “[l]egislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory
expression”).
8
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deep issues of time—for example, the Ex Post Facto and Contracts
9
Clauses of Article I.
The Clauses’ textual proximity suggests their conceptual connectedness, for both proceeded from the common law’s premise that retroactive legislation required special scrutiny because it had the potential to violate norms of notice and fairness, as well as to blur the
10
line between judicial and legislative functions. Moreover, the fact
that these provisions appear in Article I, Section 10, among the list of
prohibitions on the states (no treaties, no letters of marque and reprisal, no coining money, no emitting bills of credit, no legal tender
except for gold and silver) demonstrates the peril that the Founders
believed would result if states had the power to pass ex post facto laws
11
or laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Both provisions thus
spoke to the harms that the drafters of the Constitution feared might
result from a legislature’s effort to make its laws operate backward as
well as forward in time.
12
In Calder v. Bull, decided in 1798 during the Chief Justiceship of
13
Oliver Ellsworth, and again in Ogden v. Saunders, the 1827 decision
that featured Chief Justice John Marshall’s only dissent in a constitutional case, the Court addressed issues of time at both the doctrinal
and institutional levels. Both cases called upon the Court to assess the
temporal scope of a legislature’s actions—in Calder, a resolution of the
14
Connecticut legislature setting aside a probate court’s decree, and in
15
Ogden, a New York insolvency act. The cases might therefore seem to
have little to say about the Court’s conception of itself in time. Yet in
each case, the Court’s extensive analysis of the legislation in question
led it to consider not only the propriety of retroactive (or “retrospective,” in contemporary parlance) lawmaking, but also the institutional
9

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
10
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46 (criticizing ex post facto laws
for failing to give parties notice that an action is illegal).
11
See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776–1787, at 393-429, 471-518 (1969) (discussing the influence of the political and
economic turmoil of the Confederation period—in particular, the controversy over
wartime debts—on the drafters of the Constitution). The Constitution prohibits Congress, as well as the states, from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Only the states, however, are prohibited from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
12
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
13
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
14
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386.
15
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 214.
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role of courts, as well as the specific role of the Court in policing tem16
poral boundaries.
17
Moreover, Calder and Ogden can themselves be historicized. Both
cases illustrate the conflicts in early American legal thought between
early republicans’ simultaneous commitments to legislative power and
to the idea that the judicial power existed in part to protect vested
rights (sometimes from the selfsame legislative power). The specter
of property rights being manipulated by the government as tools of
political oppression, familiar to eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans
from their constitutional history of the Tudor and Stuart periods, continued to haunt some early republicans. As Morton Horwitz puts it,
“At the heart of the post-Revolutionary American constitutional system
was the principle that all retroactive lawmaking was an interference

16

See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387-95 (opinion of Chase, J.) (discussing the
nature of, and constitutional prohibition on, ex post facto laws); Ogden, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 221 (“In every system of jurisprudence such [retrospective] laws are considered as contrary to the first principles of natural justice . . . .”).
17
Scholars in a variety of disciplines have identified the period from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century as witnessing significant transitions in European
and American notions of time and temporality, from both a technological and an ideological perspective. See generally THOMAS M. ALLEN, A REPUBLIC IN TIME: TEMPORALITY
AND SOCIAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2008) (exploring the
changing conceptions of time in nineteenth-century American culture); LYNN HUNT,
MEASURING TIME, MAKING HISTORY (2008) (describing nineteenth-century developments in the measurement of time, including the adoption of time zones; the adoption
of Greenwich, England, as the source of the prime meridian; and changing philosophical attitudes toward history, modernity, and time); LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND
CIVILIZATION 196-99 (1934) (describing how the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century increased emphasis on “the regimentation of
time”); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 149-86 (1984) (offering a philosophical
account of personal identity across time); WILLIAM H. SEWELL JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY
(2005) (examining the impact of history on the social sciences and describing changing conceptions of temporality); MARK M. SMITH, MASTERED BY THE CLOCK: TIME,
SLAVERY, AND FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1997) (describing clock time’s arrival in, and influence on, the agricultural south during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries); J. DAVID VELLEMAN, SELF TO SELF (2006) (examining temporal elements of
personal identity emerging from Kantian ethics); Keith Tribe, Introduction to REINHART
KOSELLECK, FUTURES PAST: ON THE SEMANTICS OF HISTORICAL TIME, at x (Keith Tribe
trans., 1985) (describing Koselleck’s denomination of the period between approximately 1750 and 1850 as the “Sattelzeit,” or saddle-time); J.G.A. Pocock, Modes of Political and Historical Time in Early Eighteenth-Century England (exploring the creation of
“public time” in England during this period and describing how conceptions of time in
eighteenth-century England shifted away from a belief that “time and its events were
the creation of God”), in 5 STUDIES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE 87 (Ronald C.
Rosbottom ed., 1976); E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,
PAST & PRESENT, Dec. 1967, at 56 (analyzing how changes in the conception of time
affected labor discipline and industrialization).
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18

with property rights.” A version of this principle lay behind the Ex
Post Facto and Contracts Clauses. In construing these constitutional
provisions, the Calder and Ogden decisions illustrate the connections
between the idea of vested rights and contemporary notions about the
nature of judicial and legislative power.
A. Calder v. Bull
Calder occupies an unusual place in the constitutional law canon.
Cases predating Marshall’s Chief Justiceship seem to fit awkwardly into
the traditional story of a powerful, empire-building Court that steadily
19
expanded judicial review into judicial supremacy. When Calder does
make its way into casebooks, it is typically presented as an example of
early American debates about higher law as a basis for judicial review
and for the proposition that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to
20
criminal statutes.
This is part of the story of Calder, to be sure, but not the whole story. The four seriatim opinions in the case do indeed display a variety
of attitudes toward judicial review. Taking a strong stance in favor of
broad judicial authority, Justice Samuel Chase argued that “[a]n act of
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact; cannot be considered a rightful ex21
ercise of legislative authority.” Justice James Iredell, in contrast, endorsed a more modest vision of the role of courts. Justice Iredell argued that if Congress or a state legislature “shall pass a law, within the
general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pro18

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at
149 (1992). Of Calder specifically, Horwitz notes, “How could one bar all retroactive
laws while still managing to avoid the absurd conclusion that every governmental action that interferes with settled expectations is unconstitutional?” Id. at 149-50.
19
Robert McCloskey has made a similar point, noting that
[i]t is hard for a student of judicial review to avoid feeling that American
constitutional history from 1789 to 1801 was marking time. The great shadow
of John Marshall . . . falls across our understanding of that first decade; and it
has therefore the quality of a play’s opening moments with minor characters
exchanging trivialities while they and the audience await the appearance of
the star.
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 19 (Sanford Levinson ed., 4th
ed. 2005). McCloskey concludes that “[s]uch an impression is not altogether unjustified.” Id.
20
See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 139 (3d ed. 2005)
(describing the Calder decision as “the clearest and most definitive expression of higher-law doctrine to emanate from the United States Supreme Court”).
21
Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted).
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nounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary
22
to the principles of natural justice.” Justices Chase and Iredell thus
took different views of the basis on which the Court might invalidate
legislation, and therefore of the scope of the Court’s claims to judicial
23
review.
But to read Calder ahistorically, as a precursor to the Court’s ro24
bust claims of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, is to ignore the
case’s importance as one of the Court’s earliest meditations on temporality. Calder must be seen as a transitional case in which preRevolutionary ideas about time and institutions were explicitly held to
have ongoing significance for a constitutional order that expressed
strong views on temporality, such as those underpinning the Ex Post
Facto Clause. In other words, Calder demonstrates that the temporal
commitments of the new republic were integrally related to those of
25
the previous Anglo-American legal regime.
The dispute in Calder centered on a resolution passed by the Connecticut legislature in 1795 that set aside the decree of a probate court
26
and granted a new hearing in a will contest. The question for the
Supreme Court was whether the Connecticut legislation was an ex
27
post facto law and therefore unconstitutional. A unanimous Court
held that the Connecticut legislation was not an ex post facto law and
therefore permitted the resolution to stand.
In reaching their decisions, the Justices focused on the extent of
the Ex Post Facto Clause’s prohibition on retroactive legislation. The
plaintiffs in error had based their challenge to the Connecticut legislation on the claim that “the awarding of a new trial, was the effect of
a legislative act, and that it is unconstitutional, because an ex post fac28
to law.” The Justices appear to have been unmoved by this argu-

22

Id. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
On judicial review in the period before Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY ch. 13 (2008), which explores how judicial review manifested itself through discussions of judicial duty in early
American law.
24
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
25
One prominent example of this inter-regime continuity was the federal government’s assumption in 1790 of the states’ Revolutionary War debts. See Claire Priest,
Law and Commerce, 1580–1815 (describing Alexander Hamilton’s fiscal plans as Treasury Secretary), in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 400, 437-41 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
26
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386 (opinion of Chase, J.).
27
Id. at 387.
28
Id. at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (italics omitted).
23
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ment, holding instead that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred only crim29
inal, not civil, retrospective laws. All agreed that the prohibition on
ex post facto lawmaking applied only in the criminal context, for only
in those cases did a retroactive law rise to the level of interfering with
settled expectations that Anglo-American law had traditionally asso30
ciated with ex post facto laws. Moreover, as Justice Chase noted, had
the drafters of the Constitution intended the ex post facto ban to extend to civil cases, “the two prohibitions, not to make any thing but
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; and not to pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts, were improper and unne31
cessary.”
For our purposes, the more interesting part of the decision was
the debate among the Justices as to whether the Connecticut legislature’s act should be characterized as essentially legislative or judicial.
Justice Iredell suggested that the legislature had behaved like a court
by setting aside the probate court’s decree and ordering a new trial.
The power of the legislature to “superintend the Courts of Justice . . . is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the
present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authori32
ty,” Justice Iredell argued. Justices William Paterson and William
Cushing, for their parts, allowed that it was an open question whether
33
the act was judicial or legislative. Although the plaintiffs had not
based their challenge to the legislature’s action on a claim that it was
judicial in nature, the fact that three Justices considered this question
suggests that the Court acknowledged some misgivings about this type

29

See id. (“The words, ex post facto, when applied to a law, have a technical meaning, and, in legal phraseology, refer to crimes, pains, and penalties.”).
30
See id. at 391 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Every ex post facto law must necessarily be
retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law: The former, only,
are prohibited. . . . There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a
crime.” (emphases omitted) (italics omitted)).
31
Id. at 393. As several scholars have pointed out, the neatness of the doctrinal
rule that emerged from Calder obscures the fact that precedents existed in colonial and
early national law for treating civil as well as criminal cases as susceptible to ex post facto objections. See 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 98 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) (discussing early national
precedents for applying Ex Post Facto Clause to civil matters); 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
324-51 (1953) (arguing that the “true meaning” of the Ex Post Facto Clause extended
to both civil and criminal matters).
32
Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
33
See id. at 395-96 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id. at 400-01 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
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of institutional crossover, even at the level of state government. Indeed, Justice Iredell’s statement that the Court could not invalidate
legislation based only on a sense that it violated natural justice followed just a few sentences after he pronounced the Connecticut legislature’s action judicial, not legislative—a proximity that points toward
a belief that legislatures acting like courts did in fact offend principles
35
of natural justice.
Moreover, underlying Justice Iredell’s and Justice Paterson’s suggestions that the Connecticut resolution amounted to a judicial act
was an assumption about temporality—specifically, the appropriate
temporal scope of different institutions’ actions. This is the relevance
of the vested-rights discussion: the concern that, as Justice Chase put
it, “the federal or state legislatures will pass laws to deprive citizens of
36
rights vested in them by existing laws . . . .” Ex post facto criminal
laws were understood to be clear violations of vested rights in the most
fundamental sense—i.e., takings of the person—and, as such, the Justices considered them to be the intended target of the language in Article I, Sections 9 and 10. But the Justices’ opinions demonstrate that
they were also uneasy with ex post facto civil laws based on a belief
that the rights of individuals were imperiled when legislatures acted
like courts by granting retroactive relief. The Court’s discussion of
vested rights signals an inquiry into the temporal effect of legal action,
in particular, action by a legislature. As the Marshall Court would lat37
er emphasize in cases such as Fletcher v. Peck and Trustees of Dartmouth
38
College v. Woodward, the Court in this period was troubled by the
prospect of legislatures reaching back to invalidate settled distribu34

Such mixing of legislative and judicial functions by a legislature would later become a red flag to the Court in separation of powers and delegation cases. Take, for
example, Justice Powell’s reasoning in INS v. Chadha:
On its face, the House’s action appears clearly adjudicatory. The House [of
Representatives] did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria. . . .
The impropriety of the House’s assumption of this function is confirmed by
the fact that its action raises the very danger the Framers sought to avoid—the
exercise of unchecked power.
462 U.S. 919, 964-66 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
35
See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398-99 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
36
Id. at 394 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted).
37
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating a Georgia law repealing prior land
sales by the state).
38
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (invalidating the New Hampshire legislature’s
efforts to substantially alter the college’s charter).
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tions of property and contract rights among private parties. In 1798,
the Justices demonstrated a version of this unease by asking whether a
civil ex post facto law amounted to a judicial act and was therefore
beyond the scope of a legislature’s power.
Given the Justices’ shared sense that the Connecticut legislature
had wandered into the province of the judiciary by ordering a new will
hearing, what explains their willingness to uphold the legislature’s action? Even allowing that separation-of-powers concerns are more of
an obsession for modern constitutional law than they were in the early
Republic, the repeated references in the Calder opinions to the distinction between legislative and judicial power suggest that to ask this
question is not to project modern concerns backward onto an earlier
period. The Justices in Calder seem to be saying, “Yes, what the Connecticut legislature is doing looks judicial, and that seems potentially
problematic, but we will permit it.” The reason for this indulgent attitude lay in what Justice Iredell termed “the established usage of Con39
necticut.” As Justice Paterson explained,
The Constitution of Connecticut is made up of usages, and it appears
that its Legislature have, from the beginning, exercised the power of
granting new trials. . . . And the fact is, that the Legislature have, in two
instances, exercised this power since the passing of the law [creating the
superior and county courts] in 1762. . . . [I]t appears, that the Legislature, or general court of Connecticut, originally possessed, and exercised
40
all legislative, executive, and judicial authority . . . .

Indeed, during the colonial period, provincial assemblies had regularly exercised what would now be considered judicial power; one need
only consider that the Massachusetts legislature is still called “the
General Court” to see the lasting effect of this mixing of powers on
41
current institutions.
This deference to custom and usage lies at the heart of Calder’s
significance as a transitional case. The opinions are striking in that
39

Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (italics omitted).
Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (italics omitted).
41
See Mark DeWolfe Howe & Louis F. Eaton, Jr., The Supreme Judicial Power in the
Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 20 NEW ENG. Q. 291, 294 (1947) (discussing the fact that
the “General Court” traditionally considered legislative, judicial, and executive matters); see also CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS
SUPREMACY, at viii (1910) (describing the medieval English Parliament as having “both
‘legislated’ and ‘adjudicated,’” although “until modern times no clear distinction was
perceived between these two kinds of activity”); Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of
Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157, 1168 (1976) (discussing the
changing nature of Parliament between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries from
king’s council to legislature).
40
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they show the Justices consciously mediating between the colonial
constitutional order and the new order established in 1789. In contrast to the common image of the early Court as operating on a blank
slate, and looking only to the Constitution for guidance, Calder demonstrates the degree to which colonial practice influenced early republican law.
Calder is thus a transitional case in two ways: first, for defining institutional action, and second, for illustrating the Court’s working-out
42
of how it ought to treat pre-1789 constitutional custom and usage.
In the context of institutional action, the decisions demonstrate that
the institutional temporal connection between, on the one hand, legislatures operating prospectively, and on the other hand, courts operating retroactively, was beginning to harden but had not yet set.
Hence, the case exhibits a combination of unease with the Connecticut legislature’s action and a grasp at colonial custom and usage as a
way of avoiding the bigger issues the case presented.
The question of how the new republican legal regime ought to
treat pre-1789 judicial decisions and legislation is manifest in Calder
and may account for the odd place that the case occupies in American
43
constitutional law. Other than its holding that the Ex Post Facto
Clause applies only in the criminal context, the case seems like an outlier, a relic of a particular moment when another regime’s law had to
be taken into account. But if we historicize the case, looking at it on
its own terms, it has much to tell us about how the Court in its earliest
days understood the range of possibilities that were open to it as it attempted to harmonize a vast body of Anglo-American customary and
common law with the principles set forth in the new constitution. In
Calder, the Court chose to privilege the practice of the previous regime over any potential bar that the new regime’s founding document
might present to those practices. The fact that such a choice required
the Court to overlook possible separation of powers problems—or
even beliefs about the appropriate division of power between courts
and legislatures that might have been more accessible at that time—
42

Cf. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 8 -10 (1975)
(discussing early Americans’ self-conscious efforts to incorporate some but not all aspects of English common law into the U.S. legal system).
43
On the issue of the law’s operation in moments of transition, see Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922 (2006); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761
(2004); Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (2006);
and see generally Symposium, Legal Transitions: Is There an Ideal Way to Deal with the
Non-Ideal World of Legal Change?, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2003).
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demonstrates the common law mentality of the early Court, and the
underlying conviction that the relevant temporal baseline for the
44
common law originated well before 1789. Thus, colonial custom and
usage (and the underlying colonial constitution that informed them)
outweighed the Calder Court’s evident discomfort with allowing a state
legislature to behave in such a court-like manner.
The decision in Calder thus illustrates the Court’s early interest in
investigating questions of laws’ origins. Rather than treating the Connecticut legislature’s action as entirely a separation of powers issue or
as a mechanical question of legislative retroactivity, the Court undertook a two-tiered analysis, considering both the timeframe of the regime that created the legislative act and the temporal effect of the act
itself. Justice Chase’s and Justice Iredell’s opinions in particular raised
the issue of origins writ large by analyzing the relationship between
the institutional capacities of courts and legislatures in the old empire
and the new Republic, as well as the appropriate contours of judicial
review in the wake of the transition from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to one based on the higher law of a constitution. In addition to these metaorigins questions, the Court also considered the
more workaday question of the common law origins of the Connecticut legislature’s power to order a new hearing in a will contest. The
Court’s temporal analysis in Calder, in other words, was bound up in
its quest to legitimize the new regime as well as to reach the proper
common law result.
B. Ogden v. Saunders
Discomfort with retroactive legislation persisted after Calder had
settled the issue of the scope of the ex post facto ban. In the early
decades of the nineteenth century, the Court wielded the Contracts
45
Clause as a kind of “civil anti-retroactivity provision.” Yet there were
limits to the impediments the Court was willing to place in the way of
legislatures. As Justice Chase had noted in Calder, a literal construction of the ex post facto prohibition that “prohibit[ed] the
44

Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 879 (1996) (arguing that the common law approach of constitutional interpretation, which looks to evolving legal standards over time rather than to any particular
authoritative source, provides a better explanation of American practices of constitutional interpretation than textualism or originalism).
45
See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 150 (“[T]he more important aspect of the vested
rights doctrine was that it enabled courts to avoid the reductio ad absurdum that every
change in legal rules constituted an interference with property rights.”).
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enact[ment of] any law after a fact” would “greatly restrict the power
of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a
46
construction may not be foreseen.” In the subsequent decades, the
Court drew on the vested rights doctrine in an attempt to limn a
boundary between widespread civil antiretroactivity on one hand and
47
neutralizing the Contracts Clause on the other.
The centerpiece of this balancing act was the Court’s doctrine on
48
state bankruptcy laws. In two cases, Sturges v. Crowninshield and Ogden
49
v. Saunders, the Court considered the question whether the Contracts
Clause forbade states from passing laws discharging insolvent debtors.
In Sturges, the law at issue was a New York statute that discharged the
50
debtor from debts incurred prior to the law’s passage. Chief Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, held that the statute violated the Con51
tracts Clause. The opinion was not Marshall’s clearest, but at a minimum, the retroactive nature of the New York statute appeared to offend the Court:
The principle was the inviolability of contracts. This principle was to be
protected in whatsoever form it might be assailed. . . . The plain and
simple declaration, that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, includes insolvent laws and all other laws, so far as they
infringe the principle the Convention intended to hold sacred, and no
52
farther.

Sturges resulted in great uncertainty on two issues: first, whether
the states might pass bankruptcy laws at all, or whether this was an
area of exclusive federal power; second, whether the New York law at
issue was unconstitutional because of its retroactive application. Both
these issues came before the Court eight years later in Ogden v. Saund53
ers, which involved a challenge to another New York insolvency act.
Ogden placed the temporal-effect question squarely before the Court:
did an insolvency law that applied only to contracts made after the law
was passed violate the Contracts Clause, or did such a law become in54
corporated into those contracts as an implied term? That is, was the
46
47

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 393 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted).
See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 150 (discussing the role of the vested rights doc-

trine).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 122.
Id. at 206-08.
Id. at 200 .
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 215.
Id. at 243-44.

2010]

Temporal Imperialism

1345

Court’s objection to the earlier New York law in Sturges based on its retroactive application, or on some broader conviction that bankruptcy
laws by their very nature ran afoul of the Contracts Clause?
The Court in Ogden returned to its pre-Marshall practice of issuing
seriatim opinions, a marker of the deep divisions among the Justices
that the case revealed. Justices Bushrod Washington, William Johnson, Smith Thompson, and Robert Trimble held the New York law to
be valid, putting to rest the questions that had lingered since Sturges
regarding the states’ power to legislate in the bankruptcy area and the
appropriate temporal effect of such laws. In Ogden, Justice Washington wrote:
[W]hich ever way we turn, whether to laws affecting the validity, construction, or discharges of contracts, or the evidence or remedy to be
employed in enforcing them, we are met by this overruling and admitted
distinction; between those which operate retrospectively, and those
which operate prospectively. In all of them, the law is pronounced to be
55
void in the first class of cases, and not so in the second.

Working through the Contracts Clause analysis, the majority
placed great weight on the Constitution’s use of the phrase “impairing
the Obligation of Contracts” rather than simply “impairing contracts”
in describing the prohibited activity. The inclusion of the word “obligation,” Justice Washington argued, made the prohibition apply only
to laws affecting contracts already made—e.g., retroactive bankruptcy
56
laws. Had the Article I language referred simply to “impairing contracts,” then the restriction would have extended to prospective laws
as well, since under such analysis “the agreement of the parties . . .
would be impaired as much by a prior as it would be by a subsequent
57
bankrupt[cy] law.” Justice Washington concluded, however, that the
states would not have stood for such a broad restraint on their own
58
power at the time of ratification. Moreover, the prospective operation of the statute meant that it became part of every subsequent contract and so could not be regarded as impairing obligations under
59
those contracts.

55

Id. at 262 (opinion of Washington, J.).
Id. at 269.
57
Id.
58
See id. (“[T]he extensive operation [of such a broad restraint on state power] . . . would have hazarded, to say the least of it, the adoption of the constitution by
the State conventions.”).
59
Id. at 260.
56
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Writing for a trio of dissenters that included Justices Joseph Story
and Gabriel Duvall, Chief Justice Marshall argued that the New York
act was invalid and that the majority’s prospective-retroactive distinc60
tion was misguided. The majority’s theory that the New York law operated only prospectively was erroneous, Marshall argued, because his
brother Justices had looked to the wrong temporal frame for analyzing how the law operated. The view that the insolvency statute operated only prospectively assumed that the relative moment of operation
was the time of the act’s passage; on such a view, the only constitutionally impermissible bankruptcy laws were those that sought to
reach debts contracted prior to the act’s passage. But Marshall contended that the relevant moment of operation for the statute was “not
61
the time of the passage of the act, but of its action on the contract.”
On that analysis, any application of an insolvency law would necessarily implicate the preexisting debts of that particular debtor. In Marshall’s view, the state’s discharge of such debts amounted to interference with the obligations of contract, and therefore meant that the
62
statute was unconstitutional.
According to the Chief Justice’s view, the drafting of a contract
should be understood as distinct from the legal regime in which that
drafting took place. Marshall argued that permitting bankruptcy laws
that operated prospectively according to the majority’s view would allow a state to pass legislation “declaring that all contracts should be
subject to legislative control, and should be discharged as the legisla63
ture might prescribe.” Such an analysis would eviscerate the protections that the Contracts Clause was intended to afford to private parties. The availability of these protections did not depend on the
categorization of a particular state law as retroactive or prospective,
Marshall claimed; Contracts Clause analysis should not become simply
60

Id. at 336-37 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 337; cf. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth
of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1115-16 (1999) (distinguishing between “transaction-time” and “decision-time” models of retroactivity).
62
Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 337 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 339. Marshall’s forecast proved accurate in a slightly different context.
Following the Court’s decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819), that a state legislature’s modification of a charter amounted to
impairment of the obligation of contracts, some states enacted statutes or constitutional provisions that expressly reserved to the state the power to amend corporate charters, while other states included such reservations in individual charters. See STANLEY I.
KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 6263 (1971); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–
1835, at 627 (1988).
61
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an inquiry into an act’s temporal framework. The majority’s construction “would change the character of the provision, and convert an inhibition to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, into an in64
Finally, the fact that the
hibition to pass retrospective laws.”
Contracts Clause was grouped with the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws should not be read to confound the obviously retrospective nature of those devices with the less temporally
65
delimited restriction on impairing the obligation of contracts.
Despite Marshall’s claims that his view did not depend on the retroactive/prospective distinction, his emphasis on selecting the relevant moment for purposes of the Contracts Clause inquiry demonstrates the importance of temporal framing for his analysis. The
majority argued that concerns of notice and fairness were satisfied by
the New York law in Ogden in a way that had not been the case in
Sturges, insofar as the Ogden law applied only to contracts made after
the law was passed. Thus, unlike the Sturges scenario, a creditor was
presumed to be on notice that the debtor might turn to the state insolvency law for relief; this was the insight behind the majority’s assertion
that the law in effect at the time of the contract’s creation was incorporated into the contract itself. For the majority Justices, the passage of
the insolvency statute could be plotted at time one and applied to all
subsequent contracts plotted further down the temporal line.
Marshall, in contrast, took a less distinctly chronological view of
the relevant events. For the Chief Justice, each creditor-debtor interaction subject to the insolvency act contained its own temporal dynamics and relationships. A one-time announcement by the state legislature that subsequent debts might be discharged was insufficient to
cure the impairments that took place in each creditor-debtor relationship as the insolvency law was applied with respect to those particular
debts. To put it another way, consider that even the nominally “prospective” act at issue in Ogden operated retroactively with respect to any
particular creditor-debtor relationship, in that it permitted a debtor to
escape liability for his debts by virtue of the operation of state law.
True, the statute in Ogden was not maximally retroactive, since it did
not apply to debts entered into prior to the act’s passage, as had the
64

Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 355-56 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); see also HORsupra note 18, at 151 (noting Marshall’s view that “all state bankruptcy laws,
whether they operated on past or future contracts, were unconstitutional. Marshall
maintained that virtually all established expectations, including the expectation of the
power to contract in the future, were vested property rights”).
65
Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 335-36 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
WITZ,
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law in Sturges. Viewed from the temporal frame of the legal and economic system, then, the Ogden act operated only prospectively. But
the law nevertheless permitted a significant degree of retroactivity
within a given creditor-debtor grouping when the debtor’s request for
relief brought her prior contracts under the state’s protection.
Under the Ogden statute, then, each creditor-debtor relationship
contained a potential before-and-after dynamic, with the contractual
basis of the relationship functioning very differently after a debtor
sought protection than it had before that moment. According to
Marshall’s robust view of the Contracts Clause, this was where the real
concern regarding the impairment of the obligations of contract lay—
not in setting up the wrong chronology of legislative action and private contract, but in the potential for legislative action suddenly to enter into and upset particular contracts.
The opinions in Ogden thus articulated distinctive views of which
temporal frameworks counted for purposes of Contracts Clause analysis. Despite this divergence, the Justices appear to have shared a deep
belief in judicial supremacy for assessing questions of time. As was also the case in Calder, the Court in Ogden presented itself as the final
authority on issues of temporal effect, especially with respect to legislation. This judicial imperialism where questions of time were concerned continued into the twentieth century, when the Court
launched an extensive body of retroactivity doctrine—this time referring to the temporal effect of the Court’s own decisions.
II. JUDICIAL RETROACTIVITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The special relationship between the Supreme Court and time is
evident in the modern Court’s doctrine on the problem of retroactive
application of judicial decisions, a complex issue that has forced the
Court self-consciously to confront the relationship between adjudica66
tion and time.
This Part examines the Court’s experiments in the twentieth century with limiting the retroactive effect of its own decisions. The doc67
trine of adjudicative retroactivity dates from the Court’s efforts in the
66

My use of the phrase “the problem of retroactive application” is not meant to
suggest that retroactivity itself is the heart of the problem; the real problem for the
Court has been the distinction between retroactivity and prospectivity. On these
terms, see generally Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997), which discusses the Court’s struggles with retroactivity
doctrine.
67
This Part does not explore the related but distinct issue of legislative retroactivi-
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1960s to claim greater discretion to control the application of its deci68
sions, especially in the criminal context. Many commentators have
criticized this effort as resulting in “doctrinal confusion and incohe69
rence.”
Regardless of their holdings, the majority of the Supreme Court’s
cases dealing with adjudicative retroactivity view the choice of retroactivity as implicating the dichotomy between what the Court has
70
termed the Blackstonian or “declaratory” model of law and the Aus71
tinian or “positive law” model. The Court has described the declaratory theory as a claim that “[t]he judge rather than being the creator
72
of the law [is] but its discoverer,” and that therefore “the courts are
73
understood only to find the law, not to make it.” The theory forms
one of the central justifications for adjudicative retroactivity: if the
ty. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32 (1994) (holding that due process
was not violated by retroactive application of an amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187, 191 (1992) (upholding
retroactive regulatory legislation against Due Process and Contracts Clause challenges); Fisch, supra note 66, at 1063-66 (describing the Court’s decisions regarding
legislative retroactivity); Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and
Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2145 (1996) (arguing that the Court’s
different treatment of retroactivity in the criminal and civil contexts is due to interest
group theory); cf. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010) (offering a critique of approaches that treat nonretroactivity
as a canonical constitutional value).
68
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1738 (1991) (“The Warren Court confronted the question of retroactivity in criminal cases while embarked on a fundamental restructuring of constitutional doctrines regulating criminal procedure.”).
69
See Roosevelt, supra note 61, at 1136-37 (arguing that the current Court has
been “partially successful” at clarifying the Warren Court’s retroactivity doctrine).
70
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *69-70 (explaining that the duty of courts is
not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”). Although
the Court generally refers to Blackstone as the “foremost exponent” of the declaratory
theory, it occasionally also cites Sir Matthew Hale’s earlier HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW, first published in 1713. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 n.7
(1965) (referring to SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1971) (1713)).
71
See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 35-37 (Robert Campbell ed.,
London, John Murray 4th ed. 1873) (examining declaratory and positive law theories);
see also Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623-24 (“Austin maintained that judges do in fact do
something more than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial
interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that
alone are but the empty crevices of the law.”). The Linkletter Court’s characterization
of this view as associated with Austin has been called “somewhat unconventional[].”
Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ,
and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 58 (1965).
72
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623.
73
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1990).
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Court is declaring what the law is and has always been, then that declaration must have been the case at all earlier times, even if contemporary case law suggests otherwise. On this view, retroactive application ought to be regarded as “fixing” old mistakes and bringing the
doctrine into line with the correct rule. The Austinian theory, in contrast, posits a more creative role for judges, carrying with it an assump74
tion that “when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.”
Generally understood to provide for an exclusively forward-looking
dynamic, this view is most often marshaled in defense of prospective
application. It does not contemplate courts correcting the mistakes of
the past; on the contrary, the overruling is understood to affect only
those cases that have yet to be decided.
Quaint though the invocation of Blackstone as jurisprudential authority has become, one should not simply dismiss the declaratory
theory as an anachronistic relic of a less sophisticated era. As Paul
Mishkin pointed out, judicial decisions necessarily operate with some
degree of retroactivity, given that the fundamental duty of courts is to
75
decide disputes that have already arisen. Moreover, these decisions
must reflect preexisting shared societal rules or values; otherwise, retroactivity would be an “intolerable” imposition of new rules on prior
76
conduct. In other words, the idea that there exists some body of as
yet unarticulated—but nonetheless viable—law is implicit in the practice of retroactive application, regardless of one’s views on Blackstone.
We cite Blackstone historiographically: not for the truth of what he
thought but as evidence of the centrality of the declaratory theory to
Anglo-American common law.
Although the declaratory/positivist distinction does not completely capture the nuances of the retroactivity question, it does raise several thorny issues that touch on the underlying meaning of the Court’s
power to overrule a prior judgment. Clearly, the theories contemplate different conceptions of the act of overruling. The positivist’s
claimed ability to make law means that her decision to overrule
creates a new law in and of itself, while the declaratory theorist’s striv-

74

Id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See Mishkin, supra note 71, at 60 (“[I]t is the basic role of courts to decide disputes after they have arisen. That function requires that judicial decisions operate . . . with retroactive effect.”).
76
See id. (“[U]nless [judicial] decisions . . . reflect preexisting rules or values, such
retroactivity would be intolerable.”). Indeed, a completely prospective judicial decision—one that did not apply to the parties before the court—would likely run afoul of
the constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions.
75
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ing toward a preordained perfection means that the act of overruling
is a corrective device aimed at purging the law of a deviant wrong
turn. In other words, the positivist concerns herself with making each
law complete and correct in itself, while the declaratory theorist sees
his role as that of custodian of a holistic law in danger of being tainted
by momentary expediency. The Austinian makes no claim to having
better or more “right” knowledge than her predecessors; what worked
before simply does not work today, and rather than deeming one approach fundamentally wrong, she accepts the existence of conflicting
articulations of the law because they are separated by the passage of
time. The Blackstonian, in contrast, sees his judgment as the most
perfect articulation (to date) of a single section of the great firmament of the law, only one piece of which is visible at any given moment. Under either approach, the court is clearly mediating between
two points in time—namely, the point before we had discovered (the
declaratory view) or created (the positivist view) the new incarnation
77
of the law and the point after that discovery or creation.
Even without the additional complication of a law’s situation in
time, the act of overruling is itself fraught with theoretical complexity.
Outside the retroactivity debate, the practice of judicial overruling is
the subject of significant controversy with respect to both its limits and
78
its implications for stare decisis and the rule of law. With the addition of the retroactivity variable, the fundamental question of the
meaning of overruling becomes more urgent, requiring the Court not
only to overcome the hurdle of overturning an area of law thought to
be settled but also to determine whether its actions should be characterized as negation or as something less permanent and more benign,

77

This is, to be sure, a highly schematized version of the two views. As the writings
of the Revolutionary-era American lawyer James Otis demonstrate, even during the
heyday of Blackstone and Austin few people adopted one or the other view categorically. Compare Otis’s statement in 1764 that “[t]he power of Parliament is uncontrollable but by themselves, and we must obey” with his observation in the same pamphlet
that “Parliament cannot make 2 and 2, 5: omnipotency cannot do it.” JAMES OTIS,
THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 59, 70-71 (Boston, Edes
& Gill 1764) reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776, at
409, 448, 454 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).
78
See, e.g., OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE ch. 6
(1935) (considering the stare decisis and res judicata difficulties presented by overruling the law); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1034
(1990) (discussing the tension between philosophy and the legal practice of adhering
to precedent); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 604-05 (1987) (arguing that precedent ought to constrain the decisions of “institutions of restraint,” but
not “institutions of progress”).
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such as suspension. One’s view of the status of an overruled decision
thus depends on one’s attitude toward retroactivity.
The Court has at times embraced a maximalist version of retroactivity. On this view, “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
79
never been passed.” In line with the declaratory theory, this view
proceeds from the assumption that the most recent discovery of the
80
law is the most correct one, the one closest to a transcendent body of
law. Therefore, if this new interpretation contradicts an earlier one,
the earlier one is per se illegitimate for the simple reason that it would
not otherwise have needed to be revisited and amended. If the earlier
interpretation is illegitimate now, it has necessarily always been illegitimate, for according to the baseline presumption of the declaratory
theory, the law is unchanging. Thus, the earlier statement of the law
becomes a misstatement—a nullity that at this point is declared never
to have been law—and the new articulation is held to be the true re81
presentation of the law. In this sense, the declaratory theory rejects
79

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
Although both Norton and the example of the Attorney General’s opinion, discussed infra in note 84 and its accompanying text, both deal explicitly with the overruling of a statute rather than an earlier Court decision, the basic points about the effect
of a finding of unconstitutionality remain the same. In both cases, the issue is the
reach of the Court’s finding, not the retroactivity or prospectivity of the statute as it was
passed.
81
The declaratory theory creates, but never satisfactorily resolves, a lingering ambiguity: what if courts are mistaken in their “discovery” the law? The whole theory
rides on the idea that each decision represents a new and accurate statement of the
law, but what happens if there is a “right” law in existence and the courts simply fail to
articulate it correctly, or to apprehend it at all?
Also unclear is the status of the law in the time between the earlier, nowdiscredited judgment and the new, corrected one. As a historical matter, the status of
the law in that time was what it was: people depended on the earlier decision because
at that time they had no way of knowing that it would someday be superseded and declared erroneous. Certainly this is the desired effect, for otherwise the declaratory
theory would not permit any law to be relied upon or accorded full legitimacy because
there would always be the possibility of overruling at some later point in time—and
along with overruling, the possibility of total nullification. Yet from the momentary,
synchronic standpoint of human time, the status of the law in that time can only be
determined in its static relationship to a later temporal vantage point. That is to say, in
Norton, the earlier law was good law as long as the vantage point predates the particular
moment in 1886 when the Norton decision was handed down; from that point onward,
the earlier law was a nonentity. Further concentric circles of confusion arise if one
considers a scenario in which, 150 years after the Norton decision, the Court finds that
the 1886 decision was mistaken and the earlier law was actually correct. Now what
would be the essential state of the law between the initial act and the 1886 decision?
80
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efforts to historicize judicial decisions insofar as those efforts view decisions as emerging from a particular temporal context.
Prospective application of judicial decisions operates on a different set of premises. In an opinion concerning the status of the District of Columbia’s minimum wage law in 1937, following the overrul82
83
ing of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
Attorney General Homer Cummings noted that
[t]he decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have
no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be
84
held valid from the date it became effective.

Cummings thus suggested that although the D.C. minimum wage law
had been ruled unconstitutional in Adkins in 1923, when the Court
reversed Adkins in 1937 in West Coast Hotel, it in essence revived the
D.C. law, which had lain dormant in a kind of fourteen-year legislative
suspended animation. In a prospective universe, therefore, judicial
time moves forward in fits and starts, punctuated by repeated revisits
to and reinterpretations of earlier moments. In contrast to the declaratory theory’s gradual emergence of a preexisting law, the positivist
theory implies the rejection of a progressive, evolutionary view of
time. Rather than denying the possibility of fundamental legal
change, the positivist theory embraces change but characterizes it as a
series of doings, undoings, and redoings.
In addition to deemphasizing chronological time, the declaratory
and positivist theories share another important assumption: a vision
of legal change that privileges the moment of judicial decision and
transforms that moment into a dividing line between old and new understandings of the law. Shifting the emphasis from a more historical
view of change in which each decision must be comprehended as both
a slice across its own time and a section of the path of the law forward
in time, both theories turn the gaze inward by suggesting, first, that
each act of adjudication creates a division between the world before
Between 1886 and 2036? Perhaps more important, what was the real-life state of the
law in those periods, during which no one had any idea that the rule they knew as law
would later be deemed incorrect?
82
261 U.S. 525, 558 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia minimum wage
statute because it “arbitrarily” shifted a societal burden to employers).
83
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state law setting a minimum wage for female
employees).
84
39 Op. Att’y Gen. 22, 22-23 (1937).
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and after, and, second, that this confrontation between old and new
requires a theory of assimilation.
In this sense, the retroactivity/prospectivity analysis in the adjudication context resembles two points and a betweenness, a Time One
85
and a Time Two with an interval of uncertainty between them. The
initial decision emerges at Time One, but at Time Two we learn that the
earlier decision is incomplete and requires additional explication with
respect to the temporal effect of its reach. Remedying this problem
gives rise to another double dynamic, for the sweep of time now includes the original decision, the secondary decision recasting that decision, and the reformulated original decision; in addition to the relationship between Time One and Time Two, there is now a relationship
between Time Two and Time One Revisited. But, rather unsurprisingly,
this does not capture the full complexity of the new pair, for in spite
of the ordinal precedence its name suggests, Time One Revisited actually comes after Time Two. Try as it might, Time One Revisited can never
negate the interim between the original Time One and Time Two; rather, it must be content with creating a “new” Time One whose existence is contingent on the fact of Time Two’s having occurred. This is
the case regardless of whether retroactive or prospective application is
embraced at Time Two, for ultimately retroactivity doctrine unravels,
not as a result of the temporal application the Court selects, but rather because of the impossibility of extracting the doctrine from the
spirals of time between original and secondary decision.
Both retroactivity and prospectivity therefore posit a measuring
moment, for both require a definite point relative to which the chosen temporal effect will operate. Yet the Court’s retroactivity doctrine
dodges the issue of providing a consistent account of this baseline
point against which both past and future are to be defined. Thus, one
cannot say with certainty whether the fundamental moment in which
the case revealed its true nature came at the time of the original decision or at the time of a later holding that the original decision would
or would not apply retroactively; one only perceives in Time Two that

In some situations, as in the Adkins –West Coast Hotel scenario, the Court must
take three moments into account when considering the temporal effect of a series of
its decisions: an initial Time One in which a statute is passed (e.g., the D.C. minimum
wage law), followed by Time Two in which the Court determines the validity of the statute (Adkins, striking down the statute), followed by Time Three in which the Court revisits that earlier determination (West Coast Hotel, overruling Adkins).
85
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the two cases are necessarily related by virtue of the fact that each is
86
incomplete without the other.
Although the Court emphasizes temporal relativity in its retroactivity doctrine, the Court functions in historical, chronological time
owing to its institutional character. Yet the Court’s self-conception
centers on continuity, most notably the conviction that the body deciding today’s cases is the same entity as the one that convened in New
87
York’s Royal Exchange on February 2, 1790. The Court’s own vision
of itself as an institution is thus largely ahistorical, suggesting a mode
of judicial time characterized not by change but by continuity.
For most of its early history, the Court adhered to a general rule
of adjudicative retroactivity: its decisions operated both forward and
88
backward in time. In the nineteenth century, a few cases arose—
dealing with nonconstitutional, noncriminal state law—in which the
Court deviated from its traditional path and declared a prospective
89
rule. In the early twentieth century, prospective overruling received
serious attention from judges and legal theorists. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo was a prominent proponent of prospectivity in certain cate90
gories of cases. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin-

86

See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 61, at 1117-18 (distinguishing the decision-time
model, in which courts apply the law as understood at the time the case is decided, and
the transaction-time model, in which the law at the time of the transaction is applied).
87
For example, in United States v. Lopez, the Court’s 1995 decision that revived
judicial scrutiny of congressional action under the Commerce Clause, the Court listed
nearly a century’s worth of case law in describing the “wide variety of congressional
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity” that “we have upheld.” 514 U.S. 549, 55960 (1995).
88
See Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the concept of prospectivity “would have struck John Marshall as an
extraordinary assertion of raw power”); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I know of no authority in this court to say that in
general state decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had
retrospective operation for near a thousand years.”); see also Fisch, supra note 66, at
1059 (describing the “general rule of adjudicative retroactivity” and the Court’s eventual departure from it). This is in contrast to the general rule of legislative prospectivity.
89
See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. McClure, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 511, 515 (1870) (declining to
hear a contract case dealing with the collection of state bonds); Havemeyer v. Iowa
County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294, 303 (1865) (asserting that cases “long posterior to the
[case] . . . can have no effect upon [the Court’s] decision”); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205-06 (1863) (declining to apply a recent case decided by
the highest state court when the contested bonds were issued and marketed before the
case was decided).
90
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-49
(1921) (“I think it is significant that when the hardship is felt to be too great or to be
unnecessary, retrospective operation is withheld.”); Note, Prospective Overruling and Re-
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ing Co., the Court endorsed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to
91
limit its holding to “forward operation.” Cardozo wrote for the Court:
This is a case where a court has refused to make its ruling retroactive,
and the novel stand is taken that the Constitution of the United States is
infringed by the refusal.
We think the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject. A
state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice
for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
92
backward.

It was in the context of the Warren Court’s vast expansion of the
rights of state criminal defendants, however, that the Court’s willingness to contemplate prospective application wrought the most revolutionary changes and exposed the complexity of determining laws’
93
temporal effects. Introduced as a means of limiting the application
of newfound constitutional rights to defendants convicted after the
94
rights’ announcement, the new option of prospectivity (or “nonretroactivity,” as it was often termed) made its debut in 1965 in Linkletter
95
v. Walker. Arising out of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus proceeding,
Linkletter considered the question whether the rule of Mapp v. Ohio,
which binds the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to follow the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary

troactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 911 (1962) (describing Justice
Cardozo as “the major advocate of prospective overruling”).
91
287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); see also Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 427 n.11 (1994) (describing how the Court
in Great Northern Railway Co. “sustain[ed] prospective state judicial decisions against
due process attacks”).
92
287 U.S. at 364.
93
See Meyer, supra note 91, at 427-29 (describing changes in criminal law doctrine
before 1965 as “incremental and evolutionary” and explaining the effects of the
changes in the Court’s perspective on retroactivity during the mid-1960s).
94
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 68, at 1734 (“Even the Warren Court might
have hesitated to move as far and as fast as it did if each decision recognizing a ‘new’
right required opening the prison gates for all victims of past violations.”); Fisch, supra
note 66, at 1059 (describing the Court’s hesitance to apply changes in criminal procedure to free previously convicted defendants); K. David Steele, Note, Prospective Overruling and the Judicial Role After James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1345, 1349 (1992) (explaining the Court’s refusal to apply Mapp v. Ohio retroactively,
which would have had the potential to overturn thousands of criminal convictions).
The Warren Court chose prospective application for several of its most expansive criminal cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966) (declaring that the
Miranda and Escobedo decisions were not retroactive).
95
See 381 U.S. 618, 619-20 (1965) (holding that Mapp v. Ohio did not apply retroactively).

2010]

Temporal Imperialism

1357

96

rule, operated retrospectively upon cases that had reached a final
97
decision prior to the Mapp decision. The temporal effect of two
prior cases was thus at issue in Linkletter : Mapp and the case it had
98
overruled, Wolf v. Colorado. Justice Clark held for the Court that retrospective application of the Mapp rule was not required, citing Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Sunburst for the proposition that “the Con99
stitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.”
Rejecting the Court’s prior assertion that a finding of unconstitu100
tionality negates a law’s existence, Clark emphasized the historical
fact of Wolf, insisting that “the existence of the Wolf doctrine prior to
Mapp is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
101
These consequences required a three-part injustly be ignored.”
quiry into “the purpose of the Mapp rule; the reliance placed upon
the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a
102
As this functionalist language
retrospective application of Mapp.”
suggests, the focus of the Court had shifted from a formal consideration of the essential quality of an overruled law to a struggle with the
practical effect of the act of overruling. In this case, the administrative difficulty of applying Mapp retroactively proved to be the deciding
103
factor for the Court.
Rather than establishing a rule of prospectivity, the Linkletter holding is best understood as providing for a discretionary approach to retroactivity in criminal cases. In so doing, the Court in Linkletter
opened the door for itself to exercise a general power of prospective

96

367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961).
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20.
98
Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949), insofar as Wolf had
failed to apply the exclusionary rule to the states. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55. For more
on the question of retroactivity with respect to Mapp and Wolf, see Paul Bender, The
Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
650, 650-51 (1962).
99
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629 (“As Justice Cardozo said, ‘We think the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject.’” (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)).
100
See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (“An unconstitutional act is . . . in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.”); see also supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
101
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102
Id.
103
See id. at 637 (“To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.”).
97
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104

limitation. Writing for the Court, Justice Clark was careful to distinguish pure prospectivity from the type of nonretroactivity its holding
contemplated. The Court noted that the application of the rule in
Mapp to reverse the defendant’s conviction rendered moot the question whether Linkletter would apply Mapp prospectively, since “[a] ruling which is purely prospective does not apply even to the parties be105
Instead, the primary issue before the Linkletter
fore the court.”
Court was the effect of Mapp on convictions that had reached final
judgment before Mapp was decided. Finding what was basically a limited form of prospective limitation, the Court held that Mapp applied to the facts of that case, that Mapp applied to all other convictions on direct review and not yet final at the time of the Mapp
decision, and that the Court was not required to overturn convictions
106
that became final prior to Mapp.
Despite the conventional understanding of Linkletter as the seminal case announcing a possibility of prospectivity, its actual holding was
107
not terribly revolutionary. Linkletter’s contribution to the retroactivity/prospectivity debate was its assertion that each decision announcing a “new” constitutional rule provides an occasion for the Court to
108
The decision thus
decide what degree of retroactivity will apply.
added another level of metadiscourse to the Court’s growing consciousness of itself as more than simply the enunciator of constitutional truths; it became necessary for the Court to pronounce not just
the rule but the specific time boundaries in which the rule would op-

104

See Fisch, supra note 66, at 1059 n.15 (characterizing the Court’s application of
retroactivity as discretionary); Mishkin, supra note 71, at 72 (discussing the Court’s
“ability to prescribe any limited degree of retroactivity”).
105
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621-22.
106
See id. at 622, 639-40. Besides the fact that Mapp had already been applied to
Ms. Mapp, the Court noted that it had also been applied to cases pending on direct
review at the time it was rendered. See id. at 622 & n.4 (citing Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963)). The Court defined “final” to mean cases “where the judgment of conviction
was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari
had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.” Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5.
107
See Mishkin, supra note 71, at 77 (referring to Mapp’s retroactivity under Linkletter as “normal”); see also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982) (characterizing the post-Linkletter norm as retroactive application of all newly declared constitutional criminal procedure rules to convictions not yet final when the rules were
established); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413-19 (1966) (applying
Linkletter’s analysis to hold the rule of Griffin v. California inapplicable to judgments
made final before Griffin was decided).
108
See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629 (arguing that the Constitution’s silence on retroactivity necessitates case-by-case decisions regarding the retroactive application of new rules).
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erate. Linkletter therefore signaled a shift from an implicit presumption of retroactivity to a new power in the Court to delineate the precise temporal boundaries of a decision’s operation.
The reach of Linkletter’s prospectivity was quickly expanded in Sto109
110
vall v. Denno and Desist v. United States.
In those cases, the Court
moved even further toward a rule of pure prospectivity, according to
which the rule announced in a given case would apply only to subsequent cases. Dissenting in Desist, Justice Harlan set forth the array of
rules governing limited retroactivity that had mushroomed since Lin111
kletter, concluding that by applying decisions wholly prospectively the
Court had strayed from the original principles of nonretroactivity that
case had articulated: “Linkletter was right in insisting that all ‘new’
rules of constitutional law must . . . be applied to all those cases which
are still subject to direct review by this Court at the time the ‘new’ de112
cision is handed down.”
The dissent was the first time Harlan had argued against prospec113
tivity, and the language of his dissent suggests a genuine epiphany.
A self-conscious meditation on the various levels of the retroactivity
problem, Harlan’s dissent considered both the temporal relationships
among the various cases and the second-order doctrinal dynamic between his former and his current views on prospective application. In
struggling with multiple layers of the past, both his own and the
Court’s, Harlan set the stage for a mounting unease with the Court’s

109

388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967) (holding that two previous decisions in favor of defendants’ right to counsel at lineups would apply only in those two cases and to cases
decided after Stovall, but not to the Stovall defendant).
110
394 U.S. 244, 246 (1969) (holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), applied only to the defendant in that case and to cases in which the surveillance occurred after the date of that decision).
111
Id. at 256-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 258; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (“What emerges from today’s
decisions is that in the realm of constitutional adjudication in the criminal field the
Court is free to act, in effect, like a legislature, making its new constitutional rules
wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it deems wise.”); Steele, supra note
94, at 1351 (summarizing Harlan’s argument). Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer
note that Justice Harlan’s reconsideration of the issue began with the article by Paul
Mishkin cited supra at note 71. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 68, at 1743. Like Mishkin,
Fallon and Meltzer noted, Harlan distinguished between direct review and habeas corpus, arguing for retroactive application for all cases on direct review and on habeas
only for certain new rules. Id. at 1743-44.
113
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 68, at 1743 (“[T]he Stovall regime suffered an
important defection in 1969, when Justice Harlan joined the opposition.”).

1360

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 1329

scattershot use of prospectivity, an unease that would culminate in the
Rehnquist Court’s reformulation of the retroactivity rule.
Notwithstanding Harlan’s vigorous dissents, prospectivity spread
rapidly from the criminal to the civil context, starting in 1971 with
114
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. At issue in Chevron was the application of a
rule regarding statutes of limitations that the Court had handed down
115
while pretrial discovery proceedings were underway in Chevron.
Agreeing with respondent Huson that the prior decision should not
be applied retroactively to bar actions filed before the date of its announcement, the Court enunciated a three-part test to be applied to
cases dealing with what it now termed a question of “nonretroactivity”:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed
that “we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking
to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application,
for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for
116
avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”

Two things are striking about this opinion: first, its explicit rejection (by allowing the possibility of a new principle of law) of any notion of a declaratory theory of law; second, the subtle shift in norms
evidenced by the test’s suggestion that “discretion” had changed sides
and now referred to the ability to apply a holding retroactively—as if
the rule had become nonretroactivity (i.e., prospectivity), with some
117
leeway remaining for retroactive application.
The preference for prospectivity in the civil context did not carry
over to the criminal arena, however. Beginning with United States v.
118
119
Johnson and culminating in Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court began to
retreat from prospectivity and to shift toward retroactivity in the criminal context, adopting Harlan’s argument that “failure to apply a new-

114

404 U.S. 97 (1971).
Id. at 98-99.
116
Id. at 106-07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Linkletter, 381
U.S. at 629; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
117
Cf. Fisch, supra note 66, at 1059 (describing the Chevron Court as having
“adopted a discretionary approach to adjudicative retroactivity in the civil context”).
118
457 U.S. 537 (1982).
119
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
115
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ly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct re120
view violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”
In these
cases, the Court portrayed itself as rescuing Linkletter from the years of
misreading that had followed it, reclaiming the decision and assimilat121
Ining it back into the retroactivity tradition where it belonged.
deed, this reading of Linkletter as belonging on the retroactivity side of
the debate seems more appropriate when one considers that the holding of that case was basically unremarkable; recall that it simply found
that new rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions applied re122
troactively to all cases either pending on direct review or not yet final.
The divergent interpretations of Linkletter and Griffith can be explained by the specific historical and doctrinal context in which each
decision arose. Despite their identical holdings, Linkletter and Griffith
faced each other across a twenty-two-year gulf of case law, political
shifts, and changes in the makeup of the Court itself. Compared to
the historic rule of retroactivity articulated in Norton, or even to the
first allusion to prospectivity in Sunburst, Linkletter was revolutionary in
its bald assertion of judicial power to define the boundaries of law in
time. Compared to the prospectivity cases’ endless splintering of time
according to the precise dates of past decisions, Griffith undoubtedly
resembled a throwback to Blackstonian retroactivity. As an analytical
matter, the principal distinction between the cases is the degree to
which they foreclose the option they do not select: Linkletter explicitly
allowed for the possibility of retroactive effect despite its rhetoric of
123
prospectivity, while Griffith mandated retroactive application and
thus effectively eliminated prospective application of new rules for the
124
Thus, the decision in Linkletter
conduct of criminal prosecutions.
was fundamentally an expansive one, in contrast to the more restric125
tive holding of Griffith.
120

Id. at 322.
See, e.g., id. at 328 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the Court’s decision as
“an important step toward ending the confusion that has resulted from applying Linkletter v. Walker on a case-by-case basis” (citation omitted)). In a sense, then, the Rehnquist Court subscribed to the declaratory theory writ large by rehabilitating a decision
to correct past “mistakes.”
122
See supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
123
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
124
See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (“[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecuctions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . with no exception . . . .”).
125
Then again, one could mount a convincing argument that because Griffith retroactivity requires the application of new laws to a much wider sweep of time—i.e., all
time, past and future—than Linkletter’s from-this-point-onward application, it is actually
the Griffith holding that is the more expansive of the two.
121
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Whatever its scope, however, the specter raised in Griffith of “new
126
rule[s]” and “newly declared constitutional rule[s]” returned to
127
form the foundation of the Court’s ruling in Teague v. Lane. Focusing exclusively on habeas petitions, Teague held that petitioners were
not entitled to the benefit of decisions handed down after their trials
128
if the decisions were “new.” In other words, Teague limited the rule
of full retroactivity announced in Griffith, but only with respect to ha129
beas review.
Relying upon Harlan’s argument that “new rules generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral re130
view,” Justice O’Connor defined a “new” rule as one that “breaks
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government” or that “was not dictated by precedent existing at the
131
time the defendant’s conviction became final.”
While these developments unfolded in the criminal context, the
Court had remained silent on the issue of civil retroactivity, continuing to apply the Chevron test and refusing to limit prospectivity in civil
132
cases. The silence ended with James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
however, a case that considered three different types of temporal effect and ultimately resulted in five separate opinions, none garnering
133
Writing for a plurality of
the support of more than three Justices.
the Court, Justice Souter held that a prior ruling of the Court “should
apply retroactively to claims arising on facts antedating that deci134
sion.” Souter then proceeded to outline three possible solutions to
the problem of temporal effect: full retroactivity, pure prospectivity,

126

Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322, 328.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
128
See id. at 315-16; see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—
Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107
HARV. L. REV. 30, 97 (1993) (describing the Court’s distinction in Teague between
“old” and “new” law); Meyer, supra note 91, at 423-25 (criticizing Teague’s “new rule”
doctrine for endangering the process of common law adjudication).
129
Even prior to Teague, there had been discussion of the special role of retroactivity in habeas petitions. See Mishkin, supra note 71, at 77-92 (examining the effect of
full retroactivity on habeas cases).
130
Teague, 489 U.S. at 305 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
131
Id. at 301.
132
See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563 (1982) (“[A]ll questions of civil
retroactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron . . . .”); see
also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (declining to limit prospectivity
in civil cases).
133
501 U.S. 529 (1991).
134
Id. at 532 (plurality opinion).
127
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135

and selective prospectivity. The first two were given their usual significance. In contrast to full retroactivity, which applies “both to the
parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims
136
may be pressed” and is “overwhelmingly the norm,” Souter described pure prospectivity as deciding the case under the old law but
making it “a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to
137
all conduct occurring after the date of that decision.”
Selective (or modified) prospectivity, however, was something altogether different: the power of a court to “apply a new rule in the
case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with re138
spect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.”
According to Souter, this had been the rule in Warren Court era criminal cases; and although the rule was subsequently abandoned in Grif139
fith, the issue of whether it could be employed in the civil context
140
was before the Court in Beam. Connecting the Court’s criminal jurisprudence to its civil counterpart, Souter stated, “Griffith cannot be
confined to the criminal law. Its equality principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the same, carries comparable force
in the civil context. Its strength is in fact greater in the latter
141
sphere.” Yet despite this apparently strong statement in favor of full
retroactivity in the civil sphere, Souter’s opinion emphasized the nar135

Id. at 535.
Id.
137
Id. at 536; see, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 88 (1982) (holding the Bankruptcy Reform Act’s extensive jurisdictional grant to
bankruptcy judges unconstitutional and requiring that the ruling be applied prospectively only); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706-07 (1969) (holding certain
Louisiana election laws unconstitutional and requiring the ruling to be applied prospectively only); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 422-23
(1964) (holding that abstention doctrine terminates a litigant’s right to return to federal court if she submits federal claims for a decision in state courts, but requiring the
ruling to be applied prospectively only).
138
Beam, 501 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion).
139
See id. at 538 (“[W]e abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity in the
criminal context in Griffith v. Kentucky . . . .”). In this part of the opinion, Souter seems
to leave pure prospectivity out of the question entirely, stating that the Griffith Court
abandoned selective prospectivity in the criminal context in favor of complete retroactivity. Given that the term “selective prospectivity” appears not to have been used prior
to Beam, it is difficult to know whether this is an accurate representation of the Griffith
decision. In a way, this becomes a question of retroactivity writ small: if “selective
prospectivity” had not yet been identified as such at the time of Griffith, can Griffith really be said to have “abandoned” it by choosing retroactivity?
140
See id. at 538 (plurality opinion) (“[S]elective prospectivity appears never to
have been endorsed in the civil context.”).
141
Id. at 540 (citation omitted).
136
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rowness of the plurality decision and the fact that it did “not speculate
142
as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.”
Thus, even
with respect to the issue of selective prospectivity itself—not just as
manifested in the particular facts of Beam—the holding of the Court
remained murky.
The other opinions set forth the entire spectrum of the retroactivity debate. Concurring in the judgment, Justice White nevertheless
took issue with Souter’s refusal to speculate as to the propriety of pure
prospectivity, commenting that because the issue of prospective application in the civil arena was settled, to “‘speculate’ about the issue is
only to suggest that there may come a time when our precedents on
143
this issue will be overturned.” Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices
Marshall and Scalia joined in concurring in the judgment, cited Harlan’s position in the earlier criminal cases for the proposition that refusal to apply a newly declared rule to cases pending on direct review
144
“violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” Justice Scalia,
joined in concurrence by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, invoked
the declaratory theory:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware
that judges in a real sense “make” law. But they make it as judges make it,
which is to say as though they were “finding” it—discerning what the law
is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomor145
row be.

Finally, Justice O’Connor, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist
146
and Justice Kennedy, cited Marbury v. Madison for the proposition
147
that “when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it” and
148
found no requirement of retroactive application.
If ever a case ignored the linear movement of historical time, Beam
is that case. In it, the Justices offer up multiple conceptions of how
judge-made law operates in time. The five opinions appear to struggle
both within themselves and with each other in a battle of formalisms.
Moreover, the linguistic and structural confusion of the decision reflects a profound doctrinal and philosophical confusion which the

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 544.
Id. at 546 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 559 (arguing that Bacchus should not be applied retroactively).
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Court seems to have been aware of but unable to remedy while still
clinging to its old notions of temporal effect.
The indeterminate nature of the decision in Beam proved no impediment to the Court’s endeavor to tease a holding out of the case at
a later date. Indeed, the lack of consensus in Beam appears to have invited multiple glosses on the topic. The next salvo came in Harper v.
149
Virginia Department of Taxation. The Court, per Justice Thomas, held
150
Although
that a prior decision of the Court applied retroactively.
only two Justices in Beam (Scalia and Blackmun) had voiced definite
opposition to prospectivity while four (White, O’Connor, Rehnquist,
and Kennedy) had reaffirmed their support for it, the Harper Court
stated that in Beam, “a majority of Justices agreed that a rule of federal
law, once announced and applied to the parties to the controversy,
must be given full retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal
151
law.” To be sure, while no single opinion in Beam carried more than
152
153
three votes, six Justices disapproved of selective prospectivity, a
fact that bolstered Justice Thomas’s claim that the Harper holding
154
Yet as Justice O’Connor’s
flowed directly from the result in Beam.
dissent noted, the Harper decision extended beyond Beam’s foreclosure of selective prospectivity insofar as it suggested that pure prospec155
Indeed, Harper has been widely intivity might also be prohibited.
156
terpreted to reestablish a rule of retroactivity in civil cases, although
this result is certainly not obvious from the actual holding of the case.
Perhaps most troubling in Harper is the majority’s apparent willingness to parlay ambiguous words into new concepts. Yet in many
respects, this is the inevitable consequence of the way that retroactivity
149

509 U.S. 86 (1993).
Id. at 90.
151
Id. at 96.
152
See id. at 113 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that while Beam “yielded
five opinions . . . no single writing carried more than three votes”).
153
Id. at 114. The six Justices were Souter, Stevens, White, Blackmun, Marshall,
and Scalia. Id. at 96-97 (majority opinion).
154
See id. at 97 (reasoning that Beam controlled the case).
155
See id. at 115 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (supporting this argument by citing
references in the majority opinion to “basic norms of constitutional adjudication” and
the “fundamental rule of retrospective operation of judicial decisions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156
See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 279 n.32 (1994) (citing Harper for
a “firm rule of retroactivity”); Horwitz, supra note 128, at 94 (observing that “[t]he
Court in Harper has now also restored the norm of retroactivity in civil cases”); see also
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (citing Harper as the basis
for holding that a prior Court decision finding a statute unconstitutional was retroactively applicable to the present case).
150
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doctrine has developed. For example, Harper repeatedly refers to “se157
lective application of new rules,” a phrase that implicates both
Beam’s prohibition of selective prospectivity and Beam’s articulation of
the Griffith principle that “similarly situated litigants should be treated
158
This combination is confusing on several levels and
the same.”
stems from the uncertainty of Beam itself, an uncertainty that is magnified by Harper’s reliance on it. Because the term “selective prospectivity” was not employed prior to Beam, Souter’s claim in Beam that Griffith
159
“abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity” is difficult to
evaluate, in terms of both its accuracy and its consequences for Griffith’s civil progeny. If Griffith did somehow prohibit selective prospectivity in the criminal context (even though the issue had not yet been
identified in that way), then Beam would simply be the civil-side analo160
But if Griffith did not
gue to Griffith, as Souter’s opinion implies.
deal with selective prospectivity, one of two possibilities emerges: either that this species of temporal limitation had not yet been discovered and was therefore not available for consideration, or that it was
available but the Court deliberately chose to focus on the more extreme case of pure prospectivity. In any event, the meaning of Harper’s reference to “selective application of new rules” remained cloudy,
and with it the relationship among Griffith, Beam, and Harper.
Here is another difficulty with the Court’s doctrine concerning
adjudicative retroactivity: in order to understand the most recent
case, one must reach back and grasp the foundational cases upon
which it is built—Griffith, Beam, and Linkletter. Yet to comprehend the
foundational cases, one must read forward to discern the way in which
their meanings changed in later interpretations. Circularity replaces
rectilinearity as the temporal relationships between cases double back
and overlap each other.
To be sure, case law in virtually every area of doctrine is susceptible to similar interpretive complications. One cannot, for example,
understand the Court’s 1995 interpretation of Congress’s power un161
der the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez without working

157

Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)).
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
159
Id. at 538.
160
See id. (explaining that while “Griffith was held not to dispose of the matter of
civil retroactivity[,] . . . [t]his case presents the issue.” (citations omitted)).
161
See 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
158
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through its earlier interpretations in Wickard v. Filburn and Gibbons v.
163
Ogden, from 1942 and 1824, respectively. Moreover, if one reads
Gibbons and Wickard with an awareness of what was to come in Lopez,
one will almost certainly focus on different elements of each decision.
Yet the problem of doctrinal circularity is even more acute in the context of adjudicative retroactivity. This is because the temporal ordering of the cases themselves matters a great deal more when the cases
are attempting to enunciate metarules about how law operates in time.
An attempt to analyze the holding in Beam, for example, illustrates
this conundrum. Reading Beam forward demonstrates that the form
of retroactivity doctrine replicates its substance: each decision operates as a static element, its meaning determined by the interpretation
working upon it at that moment. That interpretation, in turn, is subject to virtually endless redefinitions based on the decision’s temporal
relationship to other decisions, many of which postdate the original.
Beam had one meaning (albeit not a clear one) when it was decided in
1991. It received another meaning when it was incorporated into
Harper in 1993, and the Beam-Harper combination took on yet another
164
In the time bemeaning in Landgraf v. USI Film Products in 1994.
tween the decisions, there somehow emerged a “firm rule”—here, “of
165
retroactivity” —which will remain the rule until the next redefining
moment comes along.
III. DOCTRINAL TIME HORIZONS
Although the Court has distanced itself from its doctrinal forays
into adjudicative retroactivity, it has nevertheless continued to experiment with designing the time frames in which its decisions will operate. In these recent instances of thinking explicitly about time, the
Court has also continued to assert its own supremacy as the creator of
temporal frameworks. In contrast to the early Court’s consideration
of transitions between legal regimes, the nineteenth-century Court’s
attacks on certain species of retroactive legislation, and the twentiethcentury Court’s efforts to take a realist approach to time by attempting
prospective application of its own decisions, the current Court’s inter-

162

See 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power).
163
See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824) (holding that Congress has the power
to regulate the navigation of interstate waters under the Commerce Clause).
164
511 U.S. 244 (1994); see also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
165
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 279 n.32.
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est in time appears to center on issues of time horizons and temporal
packaging.
One of the Court’s most ambitious efforts to control change over
166
time came in its 2002 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. In Grutter, the
Court was confronted with a challenge to the University of Michigan
167
The law school
Law School’s use of race in admissions decisions.
had adopted an official admissions policy that specifically aimed to
achieve diversity in its student body by enrolling a “critical mass” of
168
Pursuant to the
students from underrepresented minority groups.
policy, admissions officers undertook a “flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential to contribute to the learning
169
of those around them.” The policy did not enumerate specific criteria for achieving diversity but did emphasize the law school’s
“longstanding commitment” to “racial and ethnic diversity with special
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been
historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics
and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be
170
represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.” A white
female Michigan resident who had been denied admission brought
suit, claiming that the law school’s policy amounted to racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
171
Amendment.
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor held that the law school’s
use of race in its admissions process withstood scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause insofar as it was “narrowly tailored . . . to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
172
flow from a diverse student body.”
As part of her opinion, Justice O’Connor stated,
We are mindful, however, that “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.” Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time. This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that
they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend

166
167
168
169
170
171
172

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 343.
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this fundamental equal protection principle. We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all
governmental use of race must have a logical end point. The Law
School, too, concedes that all “race-conscious programs must have rea173
sonable durational limits.”

Race-conscious programs, Justice O’Connor continued, therefore required a “termination point” in order to convey to the nation that
“the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and eth174
nic groups is a temporary matter.”
Justice O’Connor followed these general statements concerning
the need for sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies
with a specific prognosis for what the duration of those policies might
be. “It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of
175
public higher education,” she wrote, referring to the Court’s 1978
176
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
Noting the
trend of increasingly well-qualified minority applicants, Justice
O’Connor concluded, “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
177
approved today.”
As Vikram David Amar and Evan Caminker have noted, this
statement from Justice O’Connor is “jurisprudentially unusual” in that
178
it attempts to set up “a transitional state of constitutional affairs.”
Amar and Caminker regard this “judicial transitioning” as distinct
from a prospective decision, in that the O’Connor approach seems to
assume that the law today and the law twenty-five years from now are
the same, but that the Court will impose a hiatus before recognizing
179
that law. In prospective application, by contrast, the law changes as
of “now” and then carries forward continuously. Amar and Caminker

173

Id. at 341-42 (citation omitted) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432
(1984)).
174
Id. at 342 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).
175
Id. at 343.
176
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
177
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
178
Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice
O’Connor’s Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 551 (2003).
179
See id. at 552 (“[T]here is but a fine line between saying, ‘Today the law is X but
tomorrow the law will be Y,’ and saying, ‘Today the law is Y but we will delay implementing that law until tomorrow.’”).
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hypothesize that the transitioning approach might be used strategical180
ly to defuse resistance to a particularly controversial legal change.
Whatever its motivation, Justice O’Connor’s statement lent itself
to a variety of interpretations by the other Justices. In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg agreed that “race-conscious programs must
have a logical end point,” citing international anti-discrimination ac181
cords.
But Justice Ginsburg questioned the majority’s selection of
twenty-five years as the relevant time frame for terminating such programs. In the twenty-five years since the Court’s decision in Bakke, she
noted, the status of race-conscious admissions policies had remained
unsettled; in addition, the Court had declared public school segrega182
tion unconstitutional only twenty-five years before Bakke. Both these
facts, Justice Ginsburg hinted, suggested that in the long history of racial discrimination in America, twenty-five years might not be suffi183
Justice Ginscient time for meaningful societal change to occur.
burg ended her concurrence by recasting Justice O’Connor’s
expectation of a twenty-five-year time horizon: “[O]ne may hope, but
not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it
184
safe to sunset affirmative action.”
In separate dissents, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist
offered critiques of the twenty-five-year time frame. Justice Thomas
joined the concluding sentence of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, “We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
185
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today”; however, he added that this agreement was based on a conviction that the
186
law school’s admissions policies were already unconstitutional.

180

See id. at 553 (noting the prevalence of judicial transitioning in the context of
legal changes involving race, pointing to, as examples, the Constitution’s prohibition
on ending the slave trade before 1808, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, and the Supreme
Court’s use of the phrase “all deliberate speed” in the second Brown v. Board of Education decision, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). On the widespread, but understudied, use of
sunset or “duration” provisions in legislation, see generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007).
181
539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182
See id. at 345 (describing this evolution to suggest that racial bias “remain[s]
alive in our land”).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 346.
185
Id. at 343 (majority opinion); see id. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree
with the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher education will be illegal
in 25 years.”).
186
Id. at 375 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Justice Thomas’s opinion exposed disagreement among
the Justices as to the doctrinal status of the twenty-five-year timeframe.
Justice Thomas referred to “the Court’s holding that racial discrimina187
tion will be unconstitutional in 25 years,” but Justice Ginsburg
188
termed it a “hope,” and Chief Justice Rehnquist called it a “limita189
Given that the choice of the twenty-five-year timeframe, as
tion.”
opposed to a general statement that race-conscious programs must
have some finite duration, was not itself essential to the Court’s decision, Justice Thomas’s suggestion that it formed part of the case’s
190
holding does not seem entirely accurate.
Perhaps what is so striking about Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Grutter is its insistence on a linear progression of judicial time and on
191
the symmetry between judicial and societal time.
The twenty-fiveyear timeframe represents an attempt by the Court to set an explicit
time horizon, a temporal boundary in which all subsequent statements
by the Court will be enclosed. In other words, with the tolling of the
twenty-five-year period, whether a forecast, a hope, or a prediction,
the era of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education will
come to an end. In Reinhart Koselleck’s terms, the Court is consciously attempting to define one of the “social and political units of
192
The era of race-conscious
action” characteristic of historical time.
187

Id. at 376.
Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
189
Id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court suggests a possible 25-year
limitation on the Law School’s current program.”).
190
See Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 92 (2006) (arguing that “the
Court certainly did not put a twenty-five year ‘limit’ on race-conscious admissions programs”); cf. Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter’s Expectation that Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years, 24 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 753, 761 (2004) (calling Justice O’Connor’s timeframe “an aspiration rather
than a description of reality” and “[a]n arbitrary line in the sand”). But see Kevin R.
Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 181
(2004) (referring to “the new 25-year limit on affirmative action”).
191
The same equation of judicial and societal time is evident in Justice
O’Connor’s subsequent writings following her resignation from the Court. See, e.g.,
Sandra Day O’Connor & Stewart J. Schwab, Affirmative Action Over the Next Twenty-Five
Years: A Need for Study and Action (“When the time comes to reassess the constitutionality of considering race in higher-education admissions, we will need social scientists to
clearly demonstrate the educational benefits of diverse student bodies, and to better
understand the links between role models in one generation and aspirations and
achievements of succeeding generations.”), in THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58
(David L. Featherman et al. eds., 2010).
192
KOSELLECK, supra note 5, at 110.
188
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admissions policies, on this view, can be neatly contained within the
fifty-year period between the Bakke decision and some potential, future decision in 2028 in which the Court will pronounce the era’s end.
In this sense, Grutter represents the high-water mark of the Court’s
temporal imperialism. Indeed, the apparently effortless chain of reasoning by which Justice O’Connor arrives at the twenty-five-year timeframe surpasses even the Court’s twentieth-century retroactivity doctrine in the confidence it displays toward the Court’s ability to reframe
and rearrange temporal issues. The “before” of the long history of racial discrimination in American society, and law’s efforts first to
uphold and then to combat such practices, is erased. Instead, the majority opinion presents an almost technocratically derived model of
how long a remedial regime ought to endure, choosing as a starting
point the Court’s own previous decision and suggesting a forward
march of progress from that point onward. Prospectivity is the method; teleology is the theory; and the Court is the sole arbiter of when
the goal has been reached.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the different approaches the Court uses
to conceptualize change and transition, against the backdrop of the
Court’s overarching commitment to and narrative of continuity over
time. The three case studies discussed—the early republican decisions construing the Ex Post Facto and Contracts Clauses; twentiethcentury retroactivity doctrine; and the Court’s recent decisions on
temporal framing in the antidiscrimination context—demonstrate
that the operation of law in time has been a central theme for the
Court since its earliest days.
As these examples from across more than two centuries of constitutional decisionmaking illustrate, the Court’s institutional commitment to continuity exists in tension with its general doctrinal commitment to precedent. Occasionally, the Court engages in intense
scrutiny of the temporal effect of its decisions, and these moments
demonstrate the complex causal and rhetorical relationship between
the Court’s institutional continuity on one hand, and its power to
create doctrinal discontinuity on the other hand. The posture of institutional endurance may in fact make constitutional law transitions,
both doctrinal and conceptual, more palatable.
The Court’s efforts throughout its history to evaluate the temporal
effect of legislation, to engage in segmentation of its decisions forward
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and backward in time, and to package its doctrine into discrete
epochs are striking because they show the Court consciously creating
moments of temporal disjunction against a backdrop of self-described
institutional stability. Examination of the Court’s explicit forays into
thinking about time offer a lens through which we can understand
how the Court thinks about the related issues of its own institutional
role, the question of when and how law originates, and the nature of
legal change more broadly. Paradoxically, from the 1790s through
the early twenty-first century, the Court’s treatment of temporal issues
has been consistent insofar as it has insisted on its own historical and
institutional continuity as well as its power to create and manage doctrinal discontinuity.

